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The definition of knowledge and its relation to belief is one of the 
central. questions of the theory of knowledge. The question is of 
sigptllcance not only for the epistemologist but also for the classroom 
teacher as it has certain practical implications. In practical terms the 
difference between knowledge and belief could easily mean the 
difference between teaching and indoctrination. If, with R.S. Peters. 
we define indoctrination as "the result of teaching false or unjustified 
doc~s or beliefs"1 we at once see the need for drawing a clear 
distinction between knowledge and belief. 
Indoctrination is generally regarded as being inferior to education. 
Indeed, indoctrmationis sometimes said to be "symmetrically opposed 
to education". 2 Education promotes and enhances critical thinking 
whereas indoctrination discourages it. The true educator must be or~ 
his guard against indoctrinating his subjects. One way of doing this 
is by thoroughly scrutinizing his content to ensure that he does not 
subject his pupils to his own unjustified opinions, beliefs or prejudices. 
This paper examines Plato's attempt to draw such a distinction. Plato 
is not the only philosopher who has addressed this problem but he 
was undoubtedly the first. and in our opinion, the most original. 
Here. more than anywhere else, A.N. Whitehead was clearly right in 
obseIVing that all the modern philosophers have done is to add 
footnotes to the philosophy of Plato. The solutions offered by modern 
philosophers to the problem of knowledge and belief are no more than 
re-statements. modifications and affirmations of Plato's original 
answer. This is in part the justification for re-examining Plato's 
distinction in this pa per. 
It is now commonly assumed that knowledge differs from belief. This 
has not always been the case. It was Plato who first made a clear 
distinction between these two. That the philosopher drew a sharp 
distinction between knowledge and belief is abundantly clear in his 
dialogues. The question of distinction is first raised in Gorgias:1 and 
it appears to be maintained throughout Plato's writings. 




In the Meno,4 Plato, through Socrates, explicitly claims to know that 
knowledge and opinion are different things. It is noteworthy that 
Plato should put such a claim in the mouth of Socrates who was at 
all times known to have denied knowledge of anything. "I know only 
one thing and that is I know nothing". 
In the same dialogue the philosopher attempts to locate belief in-
between complete ignorance and complete knowledge. This is the 
germ of what will come to complete maturation in the fifth Book of the 
Republic. In Meno5 usefulness or utility is suggested as a possible 
criterion for distinguishing between knowledge and true belief. This 
suggestion is, however, rejected on the basis that true beliefis no less 
useful in practical affairs than is true knowledge. It Win be useful in 
practice, to believe that road A leads to Thika as to know that it does 
so. In this dialogue Plato comes to the conclusion that the real 
difference between knowledge and belief is the former's ability to give 
an account of itself. True beliefs. when "tethered" by a reckoning of 
the cause become knowledge. Knowledge then is no more than true 
belief with an account. · 
This view is further strengthened in the dialogue Thaetetus. Here 
Plato suggests that the superiority of knowledge over true belief lies 
in its seeking and giving account of itself.6 An eye-witness may 
persuade the jury to form a true belief of the matter but this would 
not amount to knowledge of the fact. The magistrate may form a true 
belief of what happened but this is not the same as knowing what 
really happened. Knowledge is not just true belief together with good 
reason for that belief. If a man cannot give account of what he knows 
then he cannot be said to know it. 7 Good reason or account then is 
a necessary condition for knowledge. 
The implication of this Platonic doctrine is that in all instances of 
knowing, the knower must understand why a given situation is the 
way it is. To know X. is to understand why that X is X and not Y or Z. 
To know a fact is to be in a position to explain that fact. To know is 
to comprehend the why of things. But to comprehend the why of a 
thing is to grasp its essence (ousia). To know is to come to grtps with 
the essence, the being, the reality of a thing or situation. 
The classical difficulty with this argument (and Plato himself does 
mention this) is that it leads to a vicious infinite regress. If the 
proposed definition of knowledge were to be strictly adhered to we 
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would end up with circularity. To avoid this. it is sometimes claimed 
that all knowledge based on good reasons must terminate in non-
inferential knowledge, or knowledge that is not based upon any 
reasons at all. 8 
In the Republic we are told that belief has to do with Becoming or 
genesis whereas knowledge has to do with Being or ousia (essence)9 • 
In-between these two states are true beliefs which are the products 
of correct guessing. A man who correctly guesses a,.given situation 
but who does not comprehend the why of this fact has true belief but 
no knowledge of the situation. Knowledge is a result of conscious or 
deliberate effort. There is not such a thing as knowledge by chance 
or unconcious knowledge. Knowledge like joy is a personal and 
conscious experience. The knower must be personally and actively 
involved in the process of knowing. In this sense it is inaccurate to 
say that a teacher"transn)its" or gives knowledge to his pupils. Belief, 
on the other hand, need not be a conscious affair. To say that A 
believes does not entail that he is conscious of his mental disposition. 
The believer, unlike the knower or the perceiver, need :,not be 
consciously aware of his belief at the moment of believing. 10 
In the Timaeus Plato distinguishes knowledge and belief on the basis 
of the manner in which they are formed. He argues that knowledge 
is a product of instruction whereas belief results from persuasion. 11 
Because knowledge has an account of itself it is unshakeable by 
persuasion. But knowledge is a rare thing - so rare indeed that 
according to Plato it was only possessed by the gods and by very few 
men (the philosophers). 
This argument raises a number of problems. In the first place some 
kinds of knowledge such as self-knowledge or introspective knowledge 
seem to be outside the scope of instruction. Self-knowledge does not 
seem to come about as a result of instruction. Secondly. it is possible 
for a person to be unwittingly subjected to false instruction. And this 
leads us to another interesting question. Is it possible to know a 
falsehood? Is it possible to have knowledge of a situation which does 
not in fact obtain? Is it possible to know X in a situation where there 
is no X? This question bears on what has come to be called the truth 
condition of knowledge. This condition applies especially to 
propositional knowledge. One cannot truly claim to know a given 





epistemological status than belief it would appear superfluous to 
continue believing something we already know. On the other hand, 
belief may be part of knowing. If that is the case then one cannot know 
without believing. But if this latter is the case then the object of 
knowledge is also the object of belief. 
Modern theories of knowledge, while maintainin~ that knowledge is 
different from belief, tend to see a close connection between them. As 
we saw above, one of the conditions of knowledge is that the known 
thing (proposition) be true. Apart from this condition there is also 
what is called the belief condition or the subjective requirement of 
knowledge. According to this, not only must a given proposition be 
true but it must also be believed to be true. No one who sincerely 
asserts that "Pis true but I do not believe it" can be said to know P. 
This is because believing is a defining characteristic of knowing and 
while there may be bel_iefs which do not amount to knowledge, there 
cannot be knowledge without belief. 
Itis cUfficultifnotimpossibleto uphold the claim that knowledge and 
belief are one and the same. It is rather obvious that knowing a thing 
is different from merely believing or being convinced about it. Belief, 
unlike knowledge, is a psychological state which does not require the 
truth for its existence. What is not so obvious about knowledge and 
faith is the nature of their difference. 
Is the difference one of degree or of type? Does knowledge differ from 
belief only in type as fast movement differs from slow movement, or 
does it differ in kind as red differs from blue? 
Crombie16 has shown Plato's position to be ridiculous. Plato argues 
that the objects of knowledge are different from those of belief (doxa) 
since the two are different functions (faculties) and must perform 
different tasks. The function of knowledge is infallible while that of 
belief is fallible. But about what is this fallibility or infallibility? 
Knowledge. it would appear to us, is an infallible cognitive function 
in relation to the world, reality, or truth while belief is a fallible 
cognitive function in relation to the same world, reality or truth. The 
cave inhabitants with their minds set on material goods have only a 
belief about the "Good" whereas the philosopher has true knowledge 
of that "Good". The prisoners enjoy what they mistakenly perceive to 
be the good while the philosopher enjoys that which in truth 
(objectively) ls the good. The philosophers thus have knowledge of 
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what the prisoners have only a belief (doxa). It appears then quite 
pos&tble to have knowledge or opinion of the same object in much the 
same way as we may have taste and smell of the same thing e.g. an 
orange . This appears even more probable in the case of true belief. 
a point that is adequately demonstrated in Plato's own example of the 
knowledge of the eyewitness and the true belief of the jury.17 This 
example clearly demonstrates that knowledge and true belief have 
the same objects. Indeed influenced by this, some scholars such as 
Hintikka 18 have suggested that Plato did not make the distinction 
between knowledge and true belief. 
There seems to be no solid grounds for denying that we can 
successfully believe and know the same object. I believe it is raining 
when I hear rain drops on my roof. I know it is raining when I open 
the window, look outside, put out my hand and get wet. The object 
of both functions is the same - the rain. It is clear then that what at 
frrst was only a belief now turns out to be knowledge. The difference 
between the two is one of confirmation or verification by means of 
evidence or grounds. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING 
The concept of teaching implies at least five things. 19 For teaching to 
take place there must be a teacher. If there is no teacher there can 
be no teaching even though some learning could take place. Secondly, 
teaching cannot take place if there is no student or learner. The act 
of teaching would be incomplete if the teacher were to go through the 
motions in the absence of a recipient. Third, there must be some 
content to be transmitted from the teacher to the student. This 
content may be in the form of knowledge, skills, attitudes, or values. 
In the absence of content teaching cannot take place. We cannot 
teach nothing. To teach .is to transmit something. Fourth, teaching 
involves intentions, goals or aims. There is no such thing as 
"accidental" teaching. Teaching does not just occur. It must be 
intended. Finally. the process bywhichknowledge, values, attitudes, 
or skills are transmitted must be morally acceptable or pedagogically 
sound. This means that the teacher must adopt methods that fully 
recognise the rational nature of the student. The teacher must 
respect his student as a rational being, as one capable of thinking 
and forming his own opinions. 
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It is the third of these requirements (content) that we wish to address 
more speciftcally here. What sort of content is the subject of 
knowledge and why is th1s question ·important for the teacher? 
Perhaps we should start by re-statfngwhat we have already asserted 
above. Only that which is tiue is knowable. What this means is that 
one . cannot justifiably claim knowledge of lies, half-truth, or of 
anythingelse that is not strictly true. By extension, if a teacher's task 
is to help bring about knowledge, he must de.al with only that which 
is wholly true. 
M>w. what about the teacher who either deliberately or out of 
ignoI'aJlce "teaches" falsehood? Supposing his students, trusting 
wholly in his "wisdom". do innocently assimilate these falsehoods. 
Cari they be said to have acquired knowledge? Can one in fact teach 
that which is not true? ~f so, does that kind of teaching amount to 
knowledge? 
One thing seems quite clear. Even ifthe teacher manages to .. teach" 
a pack of lies or falsehood and even if the learner or recipient of this 
"teaching" were to accept this "teaching" it would not amount to 
knowledge simply because that which is not true is not knowable. 
What is not so clear is whether in fact it is even possible to "teach" 
something which is not true. Grammatically, of course, there is no 
problem in stating that one was taught a lie. The black men, for 
example, were taught (and often accepted) that they were inferior to 
the white men. Grammatically then the term "teaching" can apply 
equally to truth and falsehood. On the logical and analytical level, 
however, the matter is more complicated. 
The concept of teaching, like that of knowledge, iJ.11.plies an element 
of value. Knowledge is associated with the valuable, the worthwhile, 
the important or significant. Likewise, "teaching" implies value, 
meaning, and truth. In its normative sense the term teaching refers 
to the activity of"guiding" or "leading". Accordingly, the activity of the 
teacher is to "lead" or "guide" the students to knowledge. But one who 
deliberately or otherwise "teaches" a child false things cannot be said 
to guide that child or lead him to knowledge. On the contrary, such 
a one· is said, to mislead or misguide the young ones. No knowledge 
can result from such an activity. 
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The implication of this situation for the teacher should be obvious. 
We can properly be said to teach or educate only when we are involved 
in the truth. The basic condition for teaching/educating is the truth. 
Ifwe are involved in the dissemination of half-truths or untruths we 
are indoctrinating, brainwashing, training, drilling, etc, but by no 
means educating. And since the teacher's primary motive is to 
educate the youth he is duty-bound to ensure the truth value of the 
content that he presents to his subjects. 
Nor does it follow that once the truth has been told learning/ 
education has taken place. As indicated above, other factors such as 
motives or goals as well as the method of teaching must also be taken 
into account. Truth is the minimum requirement but it is by no 
means a sufficient condition for knowledge. Without it, however, the 
other conditions do not amount to much. No matter how convinced 
we may be that we hold the truth and no matter how well-intentioned 
we maybe, we shall not be educating the youth unless and until our 
content is in fact truthful. 
This, of course, does not mean that there is no room for the teacher's 
personal opinion and beliefs. Every person js entitled to his or her 
own personal beliefs and this does not exclude the teacher. However, 
in the teaching situation the teacher is expected to be honest in 
presenting his views or opinions. He must always make it clear that 
the views he presents are his own personal views/beliefs which need 
not be true. The teacher should be tolerant of the views of others and 
should indeed encourage his students to form their own beliefs/ 
opinions and to offer logical support for them. The responsible 
teacher must at all times resist the temptation of bull-dozing his 
prejudices in the name of teaching or knowledge. Knowledge is of 
what is, not of beliefs and opinions. 
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